Abstract-In this paper, a new kind of adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes is introduced. Note that forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability. The security of the full-domain hash (FDH) variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme is then classified according to three dimensions, the goal of adversaries, the attacks, and the zero-knowledg (ZK) level of confirmation and disavowal protocols. Each security is then related to some well-known computational problem. In particular, the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol confirmation and disavowal protocols is proven to be equivalent to the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, as opposed to the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem as claimed by Okamoto and Pointcheval.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background
T HE notion of undeniable signature schemes was introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen in 1989 [12] . Since then, there have been a wide range of research covering a variety of different schemes for undeniable signatures. The validity or invalidity of an undeniable signature can only be verified with the signer's consent by engaging interactively or noninteractively in a confirmation or disavowal protocol, respectively, as opposed to a digital signature in which its validity is universally verifiable. Extended schemes possess variable degrees of security and additional features such as convertibility [6] , [17] , [26] , designated-verifier technique [24] , designated-confirmer technique [10] , and so on. Among others, we also include [9] , [13] , [21] , [20] , [19] .
Undeniable signatures have various applications in cryptography such as in licensing softwares, electronic voting, and auctions. The most popular application is in licensing softwares. For example, software vendors might want to sign on their products to provide authenticity to their paying customers. Nevertheless, they strictly disallow dishonest users who have illegally duplicated their softwares to verify the validity of these signatures. Undeniable signature scheme plays an important role here as it allows only legitimate users to verify the validity of the signatures on the softwares. The first proposal of undeniable signature which is based on the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem was due to Chaum and van Antwerpen [12] and it was further improved by Chaum [9] . It is a simple and nice scheme.
On the other hand, in general, each undeniable signature scheme may have three variants of confirmation and disavowal protocols, namely, the perfect zero-knowledge protocol (ZKIP), the 3-move honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol (HVZK), and the noninteractive zero-knowledge protocol (NIZK) with designated-verifier technique.
However, the unforgeability of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme (under any types of confirmation and disavowal protocols) has been an open problem for a long time. Recently, Okamoto and Pointcheval [27] considered the security of the full-domain hash (FDH) [5] , [14] variant of Chaum's scheme with NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols. They claimed that its security is equivalent to the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem in the random oracle model, where one is allowed to use the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) oracle to solve the CDH problem.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we first introduce a new kind of adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes. In the past, the main adversarial goal was forging and thus the most desirable security notion was the security against existentially forgery under adaptive chosen message attack [22] . In the new adversary model, the adversary not only attempts to forge but it also attempts to impersonate a legitimate signer. More precisely, an adversary first forges a message-signature pair and next executes a confirmation protocol with a verifier, trying to convince the verifier that the signature is indeed valid. Note that forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability.
We then classify the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme according to three dimensions, the adversarial goals, the attacks, and the zero-knowledge (ZK) level of confirmation and disavowal protocols. Finally, we prove the equivalence between each security and some well-known computational problem under various types of confirmation and disavowal protocols as shown in Table I .
In our result, we also point out that the claim of Okamoto and Pointcheval as mentioned at the end of Section I-A is wrong. Table I , we show that the unforgeability of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols is equivalent to the CDH problem, as opposed to the GDH problem as claimed by them (cf. Claim 1 in Section VI). Further comments on their flaw will be given in Section VI.
Following is some explanation of the items in Table I . In the passive attack, the adversary does not interact with the prover. What the adversary does is eavesdropping and she is in possession of transcripts of conversations between the prover and the verifier. In the active attack, the adversary gets to play the role of a cheating verifier, interacting with the prover several times, in an effort to extract some useful information before the forgery or forge-and-impersonate attempt. We remark that if the scheme employs the NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols then it is not necessary to consider the active attack.
Meanwhile, there exists another security notion for undeniable signatures called invisibility which was first introduced by Chaum et al. [13] . This notion is essentially the inability to determine whether a given message-signature pair is valid for a given user. This is in fact the strongest security notion for undeniable signatures. Indeed, if a user can determine the validity of a given message-signature pair by himself, then the scheme is no different from a regular digital signature scheme. We further prove the invisibility of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we recall the definitions of some computational problems and the definition of undeniable signatures. We also describe the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme and all the confirmation and disavowal protocols associated with it. In Section III, we present a new adversary model for undeniable signatures. In Section IV, we elaborate on how to classify the security of undeniable signatures. In Section V, we analyze and discuss the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme under various confirmation and disavowal protocols comprehensively. In Section VI, we point out the flaw in Okamoto and Pointcheval's claim. In Section VII, we discuss the invisibility of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme under various confirmation and disavowal protocols. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Some Computational Problems
Let be an Abelian group of prime order , and let be a generator of . We say that is a Diffie-Hellman (DH)-tuple if .
The DDH problem is to decide if is a DH-tuple. The CDH problem is to compute from . The GDH problem is to solve the CDH problem with the help of a DDH oracle. (Informally, it means that the CDH problem is strictly harder than the DDH problem [27] .) The discrete logarithm (DLOG) problem is to compute from .
We also briefly define the one-more DLOG problem as follows [3] , [4] :
A one-more DLOG adversary is a randomized, polynomial time algorithm that gets input and has access to two oracles, namely, a DLOG oracle that given returns such that , and a challenge oracle that each time it is invoked (it takes no inputs), it returns a random challenge point . We say that the adversary wins if for arbitrary (polynomially bounded) challenge oracle access, it can find the DLOGs of all the challenges with at most (strictly less than ) DLOG oracle access.
B. Undeniable Signatures
We briefly review the concept of undeniable signatures introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen [12] .
Definition 1: An undeniable signature scheme consists of the following two polynomial time algorithms and two (possibly noninteractive) protocols between a signer and a verifier.
• Key Generation. On input the security parameter , the algorithm produces a pair of matching public and secret keys .
• Signing. On input a secret key and a message , the algorithm returns a signature .
• Confirmation Protocol. A protocol between a signer and a verifier such that when given a message , a signature and a public key , allows the signer to convince the verifier that is indeed a valid signature on for a public key , with the knowledge of the secret key . If is invalid, then no signer can prove it with nonnegligible probability.
• Disavowal Protocol. A protocol between a signer and a verifier such that when given a message , a signature and a public key , allows the signer to convince the verifier that is an invalid signature on for a public key , with the knowledge of the secret key . If is valid, then no signer can prove it with nonnegligible probability.
In the existing literature, the unforgeability for undeniable signatures is similar to the one for ordinary digital signatures, which is the notion of existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack [22] . The only difference is that besides the signing oracle access, the forger of an undeniable signature is also allowed to access to the confirmation/disavowal oracle. The confirmation/disavowal oracle is simulated based on the types of attacks mounted, i.e., passive attack and active attack.
Informally speaking, the forger is given the public key, and after some adaptive signing queries and confirmation/disavowal queries, the forger attempts to produce a valid message-signature pair such that has never been queried to the signing oracle. We say that the forger succeeds if it outputs such a valid forgery , or it queries a valid to the confirmation/disavowal oracle such that has never been queried to the signing oracle.
C. The FDH Variant of Chaum's Undeniable Signature Scheme
The FDH variant of Chaum's scheme is described as follows. Let be an Abelian group of prime order , and let be a generator of .
• Key Generation. On input the security parameter , choose randomly and compute . Choose a cryptographic hash function . Set the public key as and the secret key as .
• Signing. On input the public key , the secret key and a message , the algorithm returns the signature as .
• Confirmation Protocol. Given a message-signature pair , the signer proves that is a DH-tuple.
• Disavowal Protocol. Given a message-signature pair , the signer proves that is not a DH-tuple.
Remark: Chaum's original scheme (which does not employ a cryptographic hash function) is not secure as it is existentially forgeable. Most precisely, it succumbed to the basic multiplicative attack: suppose that an adversary has two message-signature pairs and , where and . Then it is obvious that is a signature of .
1) Confirmation and Disavowal Protocols:
There are various confirmation and disavowal protocols associated with Chaum's scheme, each with variable degrees of zero knowledge and efficiency. We make an effort to summarize the various confirmation and disavowal protocols as follows.
a) Zero-Knowledge Interactive Proof (ZKIP): The first proposal by Chaum and van Antwerpen was not zero knowledge [12] . In [9] , an improved version with zero-knowledge was proposed. The confirmation protocol is a 4-move ZKIP for language of DH-tuples. For brevity, we describe the complete protocol in Fig. 1 .
A somewhat inefficient ZKIP disavowal protocol which requires more than 4-move was also proposed in [9] . A single execution of the protocol is depicted in Fig. 2 . In this figure, denotes the commitment of and denotes the revealing of . Note that these confirmation and disavowal protocols are not the simple and classical cut-and-choose based ZKIPs. The idea of the confirmation protocol can be illustrated by the basic protocol as follows.
1) The Verifier sends to the Signer. 2) The Signer computes and sends to the Verifier. 3) The Verifier accepts if and only if . If is invalid (which means ), then a cheating prover must be able to find and in order to cheat. However, there are many pairs of exponents that give the same , and the prover is unable to distinguish among them. In Fig. 1 , can be considered as a commitment of the above . This commitment is needed to allow an efficient simulation. The idea of the disavowal protocol can be understood similarly.
b) 3-Move Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge Proof (HVZK):
A 3-move honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) confirmation protocol is depicted in Fig. 3 . The corresponding 3-move HVZK disavowal protocol was shown by Camenisch and Shoup recently [8] . We describe the protocol in Fig. 4 .
c) Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Proof (NIZK):
In general, a 3-move honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol can be transformed to a more efficient noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol by using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [18] , [1] , where we need to employ another random oracle . However, we cannot use the above solution as a confirmation protocol or a disavowal protocol because such NIZK proof is just an ordinary digital signature.
To overcome this problem, designated-verifier technique was introduced in [24] by Jakobsson et al. In a designated-verifier confirmation proof, the signer proves that " is a DH-tuple" or "he knows the verifier's secret key" (the signer knows the former, but not the latter). In other words, the verifier is able to produce such a valid proof himself using his secret key. By using the designated-verifier technique, one can thereby prevent illegal copies of the proof.
Using the technique shown in [15] , a designated-verifier proof can be constructed for a public-secret key pair of any well-known public key system. The obtained NIZK proof is ZK in the random oracle model.
We do not give the concrete NIZK designated-verifier confirmation and disavowal protocols since different protocols are associated with different public key systems used by the verifier.
III. NEW ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we present a new adversary model for undeniable signatures that incorporates a new adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate. In the past, the main adversarial goal was forging, i.e., one considered an undeniable signature scheme to be secure if it was existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack. In our new proposal, the adversary not only attempts to forge but it also attempts to impersonate a legitimate signer.
It is clear that forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability. Hence, the new adversarial goal is stronger. (On the other hand, the latter implies the former because if is invalid, then any signer can convince the verifier with only negligible probability in the confirmation protocol. See Section II-B.)
Now, we present our proposal and explain what motivates us to consider this new adversarial goal.
As usual, we classify adversaries by their ultimate adversarial goals. Normally, an adversary with the motive to forge a new message-signature pair is given the name forger. As mentioned earlier, this is the traditional security notion. Now, we introduce a new type of adversary. The new adversarial goal is to forge a message-signature pair and further convincing an (honest) verifier that is indeed a valid signature on , by executing the confirmation protocol with the verifier. To avoid confusion, we stick to the following notation. We denote the former type of adversary as forge ( ) and the latter as forge-and-impersonate ( ).
It is pretty hard for this new adversary to gain a success, but let us look at the motivation for the adversary. As noted earlier in the Introduction, the most common application of undeniable signatures is in licensing software. If an adversary succeeds in forging a signature (but not in convincing the verifier by executing a confirmation protocol), no doubt it would cause some damage to the legitimate signer (e.g., Microsoft). On the other hand, if an adversary succeeds in forging as well as in impersonating, then it can sell its own software by impersonating an agent of Microsoft. In this case, it can actively earn some fast money through its wicked deed. This is the motivation behind the attack.
Intuitively, the security against an adversary is equivalent to a problem which is no easier than the problem which is equivalent to the security against an adversary. We shall give examples of this using some security analyses in the next section.
On the other hand, we also remark that the security against does not imply unforgeability from the definitions. From the definition of adversary, the adversary forges and succeeds in the confirmation protocol. However, notice that there is a possibility that even if is invalid, the adversary succeeds in the confirmation protocol. Hence, the security against adversary does not imply unforgeability. We also note that if we use a ZKIP confirmation protocol, then the security against adversary does imply unforgeability, due to the soundness of the ZKIP protocol.
We must clarify that by the above discussion we do not mean that it is all right to have a forgeable scheme as long as the adversary cannot prove the validity of the forged signatures. Indeed, if a forged signature is valid then the regular signer will be stuck with it, as he will not be able to deny it via the disavowal protocol. Therefore, the plain unforgeability is a required notion of security for any undeniable signature scheme.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY MODELS
A. Types of Attacks
We can also classify adversaries by their capabilities or types of attacks. More precisely, there exist two types of attacks, namely, passive attack and active attack. Obviously, passive attack is a weaker attack.
Both the passive and active adversaries have access to the signing oracle as well as the confirmation/disavowal oracle. The signing oracle plays a role similar to that in the ordinary signature scheme. We highlight the difference between a passive attack and an active attack below.
Whenever an adversary submits a confirmation/disavowal query , the oracle responds based on whether a passive attack or an active attack is mounted. In a passive attack, the confirmation/disavowal oracle first checks the validity of . If it is a valid pair, then the oracle returns "yes" and a transcript of confirmation protocol. Otherwise, the oracle returns "no" and a transcript of disavowal protocol. In an active attack, the confirmation/disavowal oracle first checks the validity of . If it is a valid pair, then the oracle returns "yes"
and proceeds with the execution of the confirmation protocol with the adversary (acting as a cheating verifier). Otherwise, the oracle returns "no" and executes the disavowal protocol with the adversary accordingly.
B. Formal Security Definitions
In this section, we provide the formal security definitions by considering the two adversarial goals, namely forge ( ) and forge-and-impersonate ( ) and the two types of attacks mounted by the adversary.
Definition 2 (Unforgeability):
An undeniable signature scheme is said to be existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) forger has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
1) Let
be the input to .
2) The forger is permitted to issue a series of queries:
• Signing queries: submits a message to the signing oracle and receives a signature on . (We consider adaptive queries here-subsequent queries are made based on previously obtained signatures.)
• Confirmation/disavowal queries: submits a message-signature pair to the confirmation/disavowal oracle, and the oracle responds based on whether a passive attack or an active attack is mounted. In a passive attack, the confirmation/disavowal oracle first checks the validity of . If it is a valid pair, then the oracle returns "yes" and a transcript of confirmation protocol. Otherwise, the oracle returns "no" and a transcript of disavowal protocol. In an active attack, the confirmation/disavowal oracle first checks the validity of . If it is a valid pair, then the oracle returns "yes" and proceeds with the execution of the confirmation protocol with the forger (acting as a cheating verifier). Otherwise, the oracle returns "no" and executes the disavowal protocol with accordingly. 3) At the end of this attack game, outputs a message-signature pair .
The forger wins the game if outputs a valid message-signature pair such that has never been queried to the signing oracle, or it queries a valid to the confirmation/disavowal oracle such that has never been queried to the signing oracle. 's advantage in this game is defined to be wins .
Definition 3 (Unforgeability-and-Unimpersonation):
An undeniable signature scheme is said to be secure against forgery and impersonation under adaptive chosen message attack if no PPT adversary has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game: 1) Let be the input to .
2) The adversary enters the learning phase where it performs a series of queries: signing queries and confirmation/disavowal queries as in the previous definitions (based on whether a passive attack or an active attack is mounted). At the end of this forgery phase, outputs a forged message-signature pair such that has never been queried to the signing oracle. We assume that if queries to the confirmation/diavowal oracle such that has never been queried to the signing oracle, and the oracle returns "yes," then outputs immediately. 3) In the impersonation phase, proceeds to execute the confirmation protocol with a verifier on input , trying to convince the verifier that is a valid pair.
The adversary wins the game if it can convince the verifier that is a valid message-signature pair. 's advantage in this game is defined to be wins .
C. -Security in NIZK
For undeniable signature schemes with designated-verifier NIZK proofs, we have to carefully define the security against attack. This is because in such scheme, besides breaking the undeniable signature scheme, an adversary can also impersonate by breaking the public key system of a verifier.
Therefore, we first specify the key generation algorithm of the public key system of the target verifier. We denote the attack in this situation with attack. We then adopt the following adversary model. 1) As usual, after making some oracle queries, the adversary outputs a forged message-signature pair . 2) Now, is given a public key of a verifier randomly. 3) Next, it outputs a noninteractive nontransferable confirmation transcript corresponding to the given public key.
We say that succeeds in attack if the proof is accepted with nonnegligible probability, where the probability is taken over the key generation algorithm of as well.
V. THE EQUIVALENCE
A. Our Objective
Following from the previous section, it is thus clear that we need to consider four types of adversaries, namely, the passive , the active , the passive , and the active . There are various confirmation and disavowal protocols associate with the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme, namely, ZKIP, 3-move HVZK, and 1-move NIZK.
We intend to explore further on the equivalence between the security of the scheme (with various confirmation and disavowal protocols) and some computational problems, under the various types of adversaries. In other words, our objective is to fill up Table I .
We remark that if the scheme employs the noninteractive confirmation and disavowal protocols (NIZK), then it is not necessary to consider active attack.
In what follows, an scheme denotes the scheme with confirmation and disavowal protocols, where is ZKIP, HVZK, or NIZK.
B. On Attacks
We now show that the passive attack to the scheme with NIZK protocols is equivalent to the CDH problem. In the NIZK scheme, the public key is , where is a hash function which is used for Fiat-Shamir transformation (which transforms a 3-move HVZK protocol to an NIZK proof).
We use Coron's proof technique for FDH-RSA signature scheme [14] . also simulates the signing oracle and the confirmation/disavowal oracle itself. Let and be the number of signing queries and -queries that issues, respectively. We assume that when requests a signature on a message , it has already made the corresponding query on . When makes an query for a message , responds with with probability and with probability , where is chosen randomly from and is a fixed probability which will be determined later. When makes an -query for a new , where is the string that would like to know its value, always responds with a random number. In fact, assigns some values to for some in order to simulate the confirmation/disavowal oracle. When makes an -query for such , returns to . Suppose that makes a signing query for a message . If has responded with to the query for a message , then returns as the valid signature (since ). Otherwise, aborts and it fails to solve the CDH problem.
Next, we consider the case when makes a confirmation/disavowal query. Let be the number of queries that issues to the confirmation/disavowal oracle. For convenience, we consider that the final output of is the th query. We say that is special if it is a valid message-signature pair queried by to the confirmation/disavowal oracle such that has never been queried to the signing oracle. guesses the first special query. More precisely, guesses the first such that the th query is special. So, at the beginning, chooses randomly. There are two cases to be considered here, namely, and . First suppose that .
• If has never made a signing query for , then returns "no" and the transcript of the disavowal protocol.
• Otherwise, has already made a signing query for , and answered with a valid signature with probability (with probability aborts). If then returns "yes" and the transcript of the confirmation protocol. Otherwise, returns "no" and the transcript of the disavowal protocol. As mentioned before, can manipulate the -oracle and thus it can generate a transcript of the confirmation or disavowal protocol. (In fact, it is possible that collision occurs for , meaning that is being asked to the -oracle by earlier before assigns a value to . However, this probability is negligible and thus it will not affect the overall success probability for .)
Now suppose that . Let be the th query. If has queried to the signing oracle, then aborts. Otherwise, we assume that has queried the oracle on and so for some . If , then we have . Consequently, outputs and thus it solves the CDH problem. Otherwise, aborts and it fails to solve the CDH problem.
To complete the proof, it remains to calculate the probability that does not abort. guesses the first special query with probability . The probability that answers to all the signing queries is and outputs with probability . Therefore, the probability that does not abort during the simulation is . This value is maximized at . This shows that 's advantage is at least , where is the base of the natural logarithm. This is because the value approaches for large . This completes our proof.
Theorem 2:
The ZKIP scheme is secure against each of passive/active attack in the random oracle model if and only if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof: The only if part is trivial. The if part can be shown almost similarly to Theorem 1. Notice that does not need to simulate the -oracle here. The signing oracle and oracle are simulated similarly (see the proof of Theorem 1).
The confirmation/disavowal oracle is simulated similarly except for the simulation of a transcript. The ZK property of the protocols assures that can simulate the confirmation/disavowal oracle. In Appendix I, we will present the concrete simulation of confirmation/disavowal protocol in an active attack, where the verifier is a forger .
can also simulate the confirmation/disavowal oracle in a passive attack since we have only to consider the honest verifier in the simulation in Appendix I.
Theorem 3:
The HVZK scheme is secure against passive attack in the random oracle model if and only if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof: The only if part is trivial. The if part can be shown almost similarly to Theorem 2 except in the confirmation/disavowal oracle simulation. In Appendix II, we will present the concrete perfect simulation of the transcripts of the confirmation/disavowal protocol.
C. On Attacks Theorem 4:
The passive attack on the HVZK scheme is equivalent to the DLOG problem in the random oracle model.
Proof: First, we show that if there exists an algorithm that solves the DLOG problem, then an adversary can succeed in attack by running as a subroutine. The adversary is given the public key where . Since can obtain the secret key by feeding to algorithm , it can succeed in the attack. This completes the first half of the proof.
Second, let be a passive adversary. We show that one can construct an algorithm that can solve the DLOG problem by running as a subroutine. Suppose that the input to is , then starts running by feeding with the public key , where is a random oracle that will be simulated by .
also simulates the signing oracle and the confirmation/disavowal oracle itself. We assume that when requests a signature on a message , it has already made the corresponding query on .
• H-query: When makes an query for a message , responds with , where is chosen randomly from .
• Signing-query: When makes a signing query for a message , returns as the valid signature (since ). Next, we consider the case when makes a confirmation/disavowal query for a message-signature pair .
• If has already made a signing query for , then has answered with a valid signature .
• Otherwise, computes by itself in the same way as in the signing-query. If then returns "yes" and a transcript of the confirmation protocol. Otherwise, returns "no" and a transcript of the disavowal protocol. Notice that can simulate the confirmation/disavowal oracle since the protocols are HVZK (see Appendix II).
Eventually, outputs a forgery . proceeds to prove that is indeed a valid signature corresponding to the message by executing the confirmation protocol with the honest verifier. Since the confirmation protocol is a proof of knowledge of , thus can extract by using the reset technique [2] . Please refer to Appendix III for the details.
Theorem 5:
The ZKIP scheme is secure against each of passive/active attack in the random oracle model if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof: Let be an adversary who succeeds with nonnegligible probability. eventually outputs a (valid or invalid) forgery and then proves its validity to an honest verifier by running the confirmation ZKIP protocol.
Since we assume that succeeds in attack with nonnegligible probability, the verifier accepts the ZKIP protocol with nonnegligible probability. This means that is valid with nonnegligible probability from the soundness of the ZKIP. Hence, succeeds in forgery with nonnegligible probability.
Then from Theorem 2, we can construct an algorithm which solves the CDH problem with nonnegligible probability.
(We cannot prove that Theorem 5 is equivalent to the DLOG problem because the 4-move ZKIP is not a proof of knowledge.)
The following theorem states the security of the scheme against passive attack when noninteractive ZK proofs are used.
Theorem 6:
The passive attack on the NIZK scheme is equivalent to "solving the DLOG problem or breaking " in the random oracle model. Here, "breaking" means that the adversary obtains the secret key corresponding to the given public key which is chosen randomly in . Proof: Consider an algorithm whose input is where is a random element of and is a randomly chosen public key in
. If outputs such that or such that is a public-secret key pair in , then we can say that succeeds in "solving the DLOG problem or breaking ." Clearly, if there exists such algorithm , then an adversary can succeed in attack by running as a subroutine. Thus, the first half of the proof was shown.
Second, let be a passive adversary. We show that one can construct an algorithm that can solve the DLOG problem or can break by running as a subroutine. Suppose that the input to is . At first, starts running by feeding with the public key . We assume that when requests a signature on a message , it has already made the corresponding query on .
The simulation of the oracle and the signing oracle are the same as in the previous proof. The simulation of the -oracle is the same as the proof of Theorem 1. The simulation of the confirmation/disavowal oracle is also almost the same as those in the proof of Theorem 4.
Eventually, needs to run the confirmation protocol with the verifier in order to show that the forgery is a valid message-signature pair. First, it requests a verifier's public key. then hands to . next generates a noninteractive nontransferable confirmation transcript corresponding to and returns the transcript to . After that, resets . Unlike in the previous proof, has to rewind to the point that it has made the -query for where is used as a random challenge in the confirmation transcript. Using the same argument of forking lemma [28] , if outputs an NIZK confirmation transcript with nonnegligible probability, then rewinding with a different value will result in getting two confirmation transcripts for a common input , with nonnegligible probability. From these two transcripts, can obtain a witness . At last outputs . Remember that the designated-verifier confirmation transcript is a proof of knowledge of (the signer's secret key) or the verifier's secret key . Therefore, we have or , that is, succeeds in solving the DLOG problem or breaking .
From the above theorem, if the target verifier uses El Gamal cryptosystem, then the passive attack on NIZK scheme is equivalent to the DLOG problem. If the target verifier uses RSA cryptosystem, then the passive attack on NIZK scheme is equivalent to "solving the DLOG problem or factoring the RSA modulus " [25] .
D. On Active Attacks in HVZK
This subsection shows that the HVZK scheme is insecure against active and attacks (both for forgery and forge-andimpersonate).
Generally, in any undeniable signature schemes, a verifier should not be able to convince a third party Carol that is valid by any means. However, it is overlooked sometimes. It was pointed out by Damien that the 3-move undeniable signature scheme [23] which was presented at Eurocrypt 2005 is insecure against active attacks [16] .
For the same reason, the HVZK scheme is insecure against active and attacks. This is because a cheating verifier can show evidence that is valid to the third party Carol. The details are shown below.
The cheating verifier first runs the confirmation protocol with the signer as follows:
1 On the other hand, if the confirmation/disavowal protocols are ZKIP, then can generate the view (the transcript of the communication) by himself from the definition of ZK. Hence, this attack does not work in this case.
E. Summary
We have analyzed the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme under various types of confirmation/disavowal protocols using the newly proposed adversary model. Their equivalence with some known computational problems are proven. In conclusion, the results we obtained are as summarized in Table I . which follows from Theorem 1 to Theorem 6.
VI. THE FLAW IN OKAMOTO AND POINTCHEVAL'S CLAIM
Okamoto and Pointcheval [27] made the first attempt to analyze the security of Chaum's scheme by incorporating the fulldomain hash (FDH) technique [5] , [14] . In other words, they studied the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme in the random oracle model by modeling the hash function as a random oracle. 1 Okamoto and Pointcheval further claimed that they have solved the more than 10-years old open problem, i.e., the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with NIZK protocols is equivalent to the GDH problem.
Following from Theorem 1, we have disproved their claim, and further proved that the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with NIZK protocols is in fact equivalent to the CDH problem, a more difficult problem than GDH. The main mistake in [27] is that the authors missed the fact that the random oracle could be used, not only for the "unforgeability" but also for the simulation of the confirmation/disavowal protocols.
In the sequel, we first restate their claim and point out the major flaw in their proof compared to the proof of Theorem 1 which we have shown earlier. Their claim is as follows.
Claim 1: [27, Theorem 9] An existential forgery under adaptively chosen message attack for the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme is equivalent to the GDH problem in the random oracle model, where the confirmation and disavowal protocols are NIZK.
The correctness of the above claim was shown by proving the following [27] .
1) If there exists an algorithm
that solves the GDH problem, then one can construct a forger that manage to forge a message-signature pair by running as its subroutine.
2) If there exists a forger that forges a message-signature pair, then one can construct an algorithm that can solve the GDH problem by running as its subroutine.
The proof of 1) is wrong. In the proof, the forger runs the algorithm as follows. At first, the forger is given the public key ( is used to transform HVZK to a noninteractive one). then chooses randomly and runs on input . If submits to the DDH oracle, then queries its confirmation/disavowal oracle and returns the answer to .
finally outputs with nonnegligible probability from our assumption. Therefore, can forge the signature on as with nonnegligible probability. However, suppose that submits to the DDH oracle. Then what can query its confirmation/disavowal oracle is , but not . Since cannot compute from , so it cannot query . More precisely, since a prover in the confirmation/disavowal protocol takes only the message and its signature as input, simulating the DDH oracle would require to inverse the hash function , which is obviously impossible! Therefore, fails to simulate the DDH oracle correctly. This is indeed a critical flaw.
The proof of 2) is redundant. In the proof, the confirmation/disavowal oracle is simulated by the DDH oracle. More precisely, to decide whether the given is a valid pair or not, asks to the DDH oracle, and then simulates the confirmation/disavowal oracle by itself. However, notice that can decide the validity of , since it can simulate the signing oracle by itself (as shown in [27] ) and furthermore the signing algorithm is deterministic. Thus, the DDH oracle is totally redundant here as it plays no function at all.
VII. INVISIBILITY
There exists another security notion for undeniable signatures called invisibility which was first introduced by Chaum et al. [13] . This notion is essentially the inability to determine whether a given message-signature pair is valid for a given signer. Indeed, invisibility is the basic and strongest security notion of undeniable signatures. It is the additional feature, beyond unforgeability, which turns a classical signature into an undeniable one. It is exactly the same as if for blind signatures we would consider the "blindness" as an extra feature.
In the following, we prove the invisibility of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme. We review the formal definition of the notion of invisibility as given below.
Definition 4 (Invisibility):
An undeniable signature scheme is said to have the property of invisibility under adaptive chosen message attack if no PPT distinguisher has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game: 1) Let be the input to .
2) The distinguisher is permitted to issue a series of queries: signing queries and confirmation/disavowal queries as in Definition 2 (based on whether a passive attack or an active attack is mounted).
3) At some point, outputs a message which has never been queried to the signing oracle, and requests a challenge signature on . The challenge signature is generated based on the outcome of a hidden coin toss . If , then is generated as usual using the signing oracle, otherwise is chosen uniformly at random from the signature space . 4) The distinguisher performs some signing and confirmation/disavowal queries again with the restriction that no signing query on is allowed, and no confirmation/disavowal query on the challenge message-signature pair is allowed. 5) At the end of this attack game, outputs a guess .
The distinguisher wins the game if . 's advantage in this game is defined to be . On the other hand, the DDH assumption is formally described by using the following game between a challenger and a distinguisher . Consider an Abelian group of prime order and a generator of .
1) The challenger chooses a random bit . If , then he chooses a DH-tuple randomly. If , then he chooses randomly. He then gives to . 2) outputs a bit .
Define
The DDH assumption claims that is negligible for any PPT distinguisher . Suppose that CDH problem is hard. Then cannot forge with nonnegligible probability because forgery is equivalent to CDH problem from Theorem 1. Now assume that queries to the confirmation/disavowal oracle.
• If has never made a signing query for , then returns "no" and a transcript of the disavowal protocol. This is justified because cannot forge as mentioned above.
• Otherwise, has already made a signing query for , and has answered with a valid signature . If then returns "yes" and a transcript of the confirmation protocol. Otherwise, returns "no" and a transcript of the disavowal protocol. can generate a transcript of the confirmation/disavowal protocol as shown in the proof of Theorem 1.
To complete the proof, it remains to calculate the probability that simulates the environment of successfully. Let denote the event that simulates the environment of successfully. It is easy to see that this probability is given by 
Theorem 8:
The invisibility of the HVZK scheme holds against the passive distinguisher if DDH problem is hard.
Proof: The proof is almost similar to that of Theorem 7 except in the confirmation/disavowal oracle simulation. Refer to Appendix II for the concrete perfect simulation of the transcripts of confirmation/disavowal protocol.
Theorem 9:
The invisibility of the ZKIP scheme holds against both the passive and active distinguishers if DDH problem is hard.
Proof: The proof is almost similar to that of Theorem 7. The ZK property of the protocols assures that can simulate the confirmation/disavowal oracle. Refer to Appendix I for a concrete simulation of confirmation/disavowal oracle in an active attack, where the verifier is .
As a result, we can summarize the result for invisibility in Table II .
Remark: Brands is the first who noticed that undeniable signatures require the DDH assumption in order to be invisible because otherwise they are regular digital signatures [7] . In [7] , the DDH problem is explicitly formulated for the first time also.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced another new adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes, and this leads to a new adversary model which is slightly stronger than the existing one. We also classified the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme according to three dimensions, the attacks, the adversarial goals and the ZK level of confirmation and disavowal protocols, and then related each security to some well-known computational problem. In addition, we also pointed out the flaw in Okamoto and Pointcheval's claim, i.e., we proved that the unforgeability of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols is equivalent to the CDH problem, as opposed to the GDH problem as claimed by them. Finally, we also discussed the notion of invisibility of the scheme under various confirmation and disavowal protocols.
APPENDIX I SIMULATION OF ZKIP CONFIRMATION/DISAVOWAL PROTOCOL
If a protocol has zero-knowledge property, it is possible for the simulator to convince the verifier that the given input is valid without knowing any special information (such as the signing key) nor having infinitely computational power provided that it can reset the verifier. The above argument holds for any verifier.
In this section, we give a concrete simulator for the ZKIP confirmation and disavowal protocols respectively. Note that the received in step 5 is the same as the received in step 1. Also, it is easy to see that and . Hence, and .
B. Simulator for the Disavowal Protocol on
Repeat the following steps a predetermined number of times. 1) Receive from the verifier. 2) Choose randomly from and send a commitment of to the verifier. 3) Receive from the verifier. 4) Find such that .
5) If
, then decommit . Otherwise, reset the verifier and goto step 1. In step 5, holds with probability because is randomly chosen from . Hence, the simulator resets the verifier times on average.
APPENDIX II SIMULATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF HVZK
CONFIRMATION/DISAVOWAL PROTOCOL First, we describe how to simulate a transcript of HVZK confirmation protocol for a valid message-signature pair . We assume that has already been asked to the random oracle and for a random element . (In the rest of this paper, we assume the same situation.) Since is a valid pair, . Recall that as depicted in Fig. 3 , a real transcript is such that is a random number and for a random element . The check equations are as follows:
To compute a transcript, we first choose and randomly from , and compute and from the above equations. Then the distribution of is equivalent to that of a real transcript. Remember that it is enough to simulate a transcript between a signer and an honest verifier, that is, is always a random value.
Next, we explain how to simulate a transcript of HVZK disavowal protocol for an invalid message-signature pair . Please refer to Fig. 4 for the real transcript of HVZK disavowal protocol. Since is not a valid pair, . To make a transcript which is indistinguishable from a real transcript, we first choose randomly and compute . (Here, is a valid signature of .) Next, choose randomly, and compute Then is a transcript for the disavowal protocol.
APPENDIX III KNOWLEDGE EXTRACTOR OF HVZK CONFIRMATION PROTOCOL
First, the knowledge extractor runs the signer (or the malicious prover) and gets a view of the protocol . If they satisfy and , then it resets the signer and runs it once more with a fresh . Otherwise, aborts. Let the second view be . If they satisfy and , moreover, if , then outputs , otherwise it aborts. If outputs , then is the discrete logarithm of . The probability that outputs is , where is the success probability of the prover [2] .
